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Introduction 
 
There is a burgeoning literature on the financial crisis. The topics examined by most of this 
literature fall in three categories: i) the causes of the crisis and the new EU institutions that 
have been set up in response, ii) the rights and obligations of Eurozone members and the 
support that has been provided by some Member States to other Member States, and iii) 
the state aid that has been granted to banks and other financial institutions. 
 
As of 1 January 2016, the Single Resolution Mechanism [SRM] has become fully operational. 
The purpose of the SRM, as laid down by Regulation 806/20144 is to ensure the orderly 
restructuring of banks which would otherwise fail. Orderly restructuring and, if necessary, 
closure of banks, are intended to prevent the collapse of any bank from affecting the whole 
financial system. The SRM also aims to protect taxpayers by forcing shareholders and 
creditors of banks to be bailed in first before any public money is used to shore up ailing 
banks. 
 
The SRM is the counterpart to the Single Supervisory Mechanism which confers supervisory 
tasks to the European Central Bank. Both apply to Eurozone countries and any other 
Member State that wishes to participate. The SRM Regulation is accompanied by Directive 
2014/595 on the recovery and resolution of banks [or BRRD] that applies to all Member 
States and requires them to establish national resolution authorities. 
 
The SRM and BRRD in effect mean that as of 1 January 2016, state aid will only be an option 
of last resort when a bank gets into trouble and needs external support. This is because the 
Single Resolution Board, which has also been established by the SRM Regulation, and the 
national resolution authorities will first have to ask shareholders, creditors and other private 
investors to contribute before turning to the Single Resolution Fund [SRF] and the national 
resolution funds [NRF]. Taxpayers’ money will be used only if the private contributions and 
the support from the SRF and NRF prove to be insufficient. But then if all this money is not 
enough, it may be that the bank cannot become viable again and therefore it will have to be 
closed down. This is another reason why state aid will become rare in the banking sector. 
Not only will shareholders and creditors be bailed in first, but also banks will be allowed to 
fail, probably more often than in the past. Bank closure will be more frequent or a more 
realistic option because the SRM and BRRD will aim to separate the sustainable from the 
unsustainable operations of ailing banks so as to contain any negative impact on the rest of 
the financial system. Once systemic failure is controlled, the unviable bank can be allowed 
to close down. 
                             
                                                          
4
 Regulation 806/2014/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2014 establishing uniform 
rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the 
framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund and amending Regulation (EU) No 
1093/2010, [2014] OJ L 225/1. 
5
 Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a 
framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council 
Directive 82/891/EEC, and Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 
2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU, and Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 648/2012, of the European 
Parliament and of the Council, [2014] OJ L 173/190. 
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It should also be noted that, by ranking who gets bailed in, the SRM and BRRD, together 
with the rules on deposit guarantees, make bank runs very unlikely. This is because covered 
depositors [i.e. with deposits up to EUR 100,000] are excluded from bailing ins and are 
protected up to EUR 100,000. 
 
Both the SRM Regulation and the BRRD have provisions on state aid. When a ministry of 
finance injects capital in a bank to rescue it, there is no doubt that it grants state aid. 
However, it is not so obvious why capital from the Single Resolution Fund or the national 
resolution funds would also be classified as state aid. First, the resources of the SRF and of 
the NRFs are contributed by banks themselves. Second, the Single Resolution Board that 
manages the SRF is not a national authority. It normally does not fall in the category of 
institutions covered by Article 107(1) TFEU. Third, any money that is injected in a bank by 
the SRF would normally be granted via a channel that is controlled by a national authority. 
 
The purpose of this article is to examine the reasons and consequences of the application of 
state aid control to support from the SRF and to identify the likely differences between 
support from the SRF and from the NRFs. 
 
The structure of the article is as follows. First, it reviews how state aid rules apply to banks 
and other financial institutions and how these rules have evolved. Second, it identifies the 
provisions the SRM Regulation and the BRRD that refer to state aid and considers how state 
aid rules and procedures may apply to bank resolution undertaken by the SRB or the 
national resolution authorities. Third, it examines several recent Commission decisions on 
bank resolution and assesses the views of the Commission why state aid rules should apply. 
Fourth, it draws a number of conclusions about the implications of applying state aid control 
and discipline to support granted both by national and EU institutions. 
 
The main conclusion of the article is that, although it is surprising that state aid rules would 
apply to funding managed by EU institutions, state aid rules are likely to ensure equal 
treatment of Eurozone and non-Eurozone banks. However, the interjection of state aid 
compliance at the EU level will likely complicate authorisation procedures. 
 
State aid rules that apply to banks and other financial institutions 
 
There are several sets of state aid rules that may apply to banks. Which rules apply depends 
on when the measure was notified to the Commission by the Member State. The relevant 
rules and time periods are as follows. 
 
1) Before October 2008 
The Commission applied to banks the rules contained in the normal rescue & restructuring 
guidelines. Indeed, despite the arguments of the UK to the contrary, the Commission 
refused to authorise state aid to Northern Rock – the first bank that had to be rescued when 
the crisis broke out – on the basis of Article 107(3)(b) [to remedy a serious disturbance in 
the economy of a Member State].6 The normal rescue & restructuring guidelines are based 
on Article 107(3)(c) [for the development of an economic activity].  
                                                          
6
 UK – NN 70/2007. 
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2) Between 13 October 2008 and 31 July 2013 
Soon after the outbreak of the financial crisis, the Commission adopted its first set of rules 
that applied specifically to financial institutions. The legal basis of these rules is Article 
107(3)(b). The Banking Communication of October 20087 was accompanied by other 
measures that were introduced in the period 2008-2009. In addition to the Banking 
Communication, there was the Recapitalisation Communication8, the Impaired Assets 
Communication9, the Restructuring Communication, as well as the Prolongation 
Communication of 201010 and of 201111. The Commission also departed from its normal 
procedures by expediting the assessment of state aid to banks and determining its 
compatibility within a few days rather than a few months. 
 
3) Between 1 August 2013 and 31 December 2014 
The Commission adopted a new Banking Communication which came into effect on 1 
August and continues to be in force.12 It replaces the 2008 Banking Communication and 
supplements the remaining crisis rules (in particular the Recapitalisation Communication, 
the Impaired Assets Communication and the Restructuring Communication13). Most 
importantly, the 2013 rules introduced a more effective restructuring process for aided 
banks and strengthened burden-sharing requirements, asking shareholders and sub-
ordinated debt-holders to contribute before aid could be granted. 
 
4) Between 1 January 2015 and 31 December 2015 
According to the SRM Regulation and BRRD the default option for failing banks is to go into 
normal insolvency proceedings. Only if the competent resolution authority decides that it is 
in the public interest to do so, they can be resolved in line with the provisions of the BRRD. 
State aid to failing banks notified to the Commission after 1 January 2015 can only be 
granted if the bank is put into resolution, in compliance with the provisions of the BRRD in 
addition to EU state aid rules. The only exception is a so-called “precautionary 
recapitalisation”, allowing state aid outside of resolution in narrowly defined circumstances 
[Article 32(4) of the BRRD and Article 18(4) of the SRM Regulation]. 
 
5) From 1 January 2016 
                                                          
7
 Communication from the Commission on the application of State aid rules to measures taken in 
relation to financial institutions in the context of the current global financial crisis, [2008] OJ C 270/8. 
8
 Communication from the Commission on the recapitalisation of financial institutions in the current financial 
crisis: limitation of aid to the minimum necessary and safeguards against undue distortions of competition, 
[2009] OJ C 10/2. 
9
 Communication from the Commission on the treatment of impaired assets in the Community 
banking sector, [2009] OJ C 72/1. 
10
 Communication from the Commission on the application, from 1 January 2011, of State aid rules to support 
measures in favour of banks in the context of the financial crisis, [2010] OJ C 329/7. 
11
 Communication from the Commission on the application, from 1 January 2012, of State aid rules to support 
measures in favour of banks in the context of the financial crisis, [2011] OJ C 356/7. 
12
 Communication from the Commission on the application, from 1 August 2013, of State aid rules to support 
measures in favour of banks in the context of the financial crisis, [2013] OJ C 216/1. 
13
 Commission communication on the return to viability and the assessment of restructuring measures in the 
financial sector in the current crisis under the State aid rules, [2009] OJ C 195/9. 
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According to the BRRD, any state aid notified to the Commission that triggers resolution 
under the BRRD can only be approved subject to bail-in of at least 8% of the bank's total 
liabilities, which may require also converting senior debt and uncovered deposits. 
 
The Commission has applied these rules with increasing strictness in about 450 decisions in 
the period 2008-2015.14 Initially, Member States were given much leeway to grant liquidity 
guarantees and inject fresh capital in banks. The banks themselves were allowed not to 
offer compensatory measures, as is normally the practice with the rescue and/or 
restructuring of companies in other sectors, because the value of their assets were 
depressed and forced sale would have been difficult and not have generated sufficient 
revenue. Gradually, however, the Commission imposed stricter requirements such as the 
full implementation of restructuring plans capable of restoring the long-term viability of the 
banks in question, withdrawal from non-core business and regions, adequate remuneration 
of public funds and behavioural restrictions on beneficiary banks with respect to the 
marking of their products and possible acquisition of other banks.15 
 
The Commission had to strike a balance between preventing systemic failure and serious 
disturbance in the economy of a Member State, on the one hand, and preventing distortions 
to competition in the internal market, on the other. As the crisis abated and the prospect of 
serious disturbance declined, the rules have been tightened to prevent unnecessary 
distortions to competition. 
 
Specifically with regard to resolution of banks, points 70-82 of the 2013 Banking 
Communication lay down s set of criteria that the Commission has used to determine the 
compatibility of any aid with the internal market:  
1. Limitation of liquidation costs: Aid should enable the bank to be wound up in an orderly 
fashion, while limiting the amount of aid to the minimum necessary. 
2. Limitation of distortions of competition: Aid should not result in undue distortion of 
competition.  
3. Own contribution (burden-sharing): The bank [i.e. its owners or creditors] should bear a 
portion of the liquidation costs. In addition, the claims of shareholders and subordinated 
debt holders must not be transferred to any continuing economic activity. 
4. Restoring long-term viability: The sale of an ailing bank to another financial institution 
can contribute to the restoration of long-term viability, if the purchaser is viable and 
capable of absorbing the transfer of the ailing bank. 
 
Furthermore, section 6.3 of the 2013 Banking Communication, exclude the presence of aid 
to the purchaser if the sale is organised via an open and unconditional competitive tender 
and the assets are sold to the highest bidder.  
 
                                                          
14
 C. Quigley QC, European State Aid Law and Policy (3rd edition, Hart Publishing, 2015), p. 467. 
15
 F.-C. Laprévote, M. Paron, ‘The Commission’s Decisional Practice on State Aid to Banks: An Update’, 14 
European State Aid Law Quarterly (2015), p. 88-116. 
See also DG Competition’s statistics on state aid to banks. They can be accessed at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/scoreboard/financial_economic_crisis_aid_en.html 
See also the overview of ongoing investigations, which was updated in January 2016: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/recovery/banking_case_list_public.pdf 
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In summary, state aid is allowed only if: 
1. The use of taxpayer money is limited through appropriate burden-sharing measures. 
This requires the bank, its owners and creditors to contribute to the cost of the bank 
failure before the taxpayer can be exposed to the risk of becoming part owner of a bank. 
2. Banks undergo the necessary in-depth restructuring to return to long-term viability 
without further need for state support on the basis of a restructuring plan, or if this is 
not possible, they are wound down and exit the market in an orderly fashion. 
3. Distortions of competition are limited through proportionate remedies. Since state aid 
distorts competition, as it gives the recipient bank an advantage over its competitors, it 
needs to be balanced out by ordering the bank to close or sell parts of their businesses 
or ensuring through behavioural constraints that it does not use the aid to undercut 
their competitors. 
 
The BRRD and SRM rules on financing of resolution 
 
In order to be effective, the resolution of a bank normally needs a certain amount of 
funding. For example, if the authorities create a “bridge” bank, it will need capital or short 
term loans to be able to operate. These costs are to be borne by the banking sector rather 
than taxpayers.16 
 
For this reason, the BRRD requires every Member State to set up financing arrangements 
which are funded with contributions from banks and investment firms in proportion to their 
liabilities and risk profile. Banks contribute in relation to their share of specific liabilities of 
the total size of the national financial sector so that those who contribute most could 
potentially benefit most in case they enter resolution. 
 
The national financing arrangements are funded ex-ante. Contributions are raised from 
banks annually over a 10 year period in order to reach a target funding level of at least 1% of 
covered deposits [i.e. deposits up to EUR 100,000]. 
 
Each national fund finances the resolution of the entities established in its own territory. For 
cross-border groups, the relevant national arrangements are required to contribute to a 
funding plan pre-agreed between the competent resolution authorities. If the ex-ante funds 
are insufficient to deal with the resolution of an institution, further contributions will be 
raised (ex post). 
 
In case of need, national financing schemes are also able to borrow from one another. Other 
schemes can provide support unless they consider that such lending would for instance 
leave them without sufficient funds to deal with an imminent resolution action in their own 
national market.  
 
Shareholders and creditors of the bank under resolution bear the cost of the bank failure in 
the first instance. Recapitalisation is to be financed primarily by these stakeholders. 
However, the BRRD and SRM provide that after these stakeholders have borne sufficient 
losses (i.e. 8% of the liabilities of the bank under resolution) through write-down or 
                                                          
16
 J. Armour, ‘Crisis Management and Resolution’, in N. Moloney, E. Ferran and J. Payne (eds.), The Oxford 
Handbook of Financial Regulation (Oxford University Press, 2014). 
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conversion, in exceptional circumstances the resolution financing arrangement may bear 
remaining losses but only up to 5% of the bank's liabilities. 
 
This restrictive approach is intended to be a remedy to the moral hazard that might arise 
with the creation of a large fund. These restrictions mean that in practice the main use of 
the resolution funds will be limited to, for example, providing loans to a bridge institution, 
purchasing specific assets of an institution under resolution, guarantee certain assets or 
liabilities of the institution under resolution, or in exceptional circumstances contributing to 
loss absorption by replacing creditors who would have been bailed in. 
 
The main aim of bail-in is to stabilise a failing bank so that its essential services can continue, 
without the need for bail-out by public funds. The tool enables authorities to recapitalise a 
failing bank through the write-down of liabilities and/or their conversion to equity so that 
the bank can continue as a going concern. This would avoid disruption to the financial 
system that would likely be caused by stopping or interrupting the bank's critical services, 
and give the authorities time to reorganise the bank or wind down parts of its business in an 
orderly manner – an “open bank resolution”. In the process, shareholders should be 
severely diluted or wiped out, and management be replaced.17 
 
In a “closed bank resolution” the bank would be split in two, a good bank or bridge bank and 
a bad bank. The good bank-bridge bank is a newly created legal entity which continues to 
operate, while the old bad bank is liquidated. Bank creditors that are not systemic can either 
be left with the old bank and undergo losses as part of the liquidation or be transferred to 
the new bank either reducing their claims or converting them into equity. 
 
Bail-in potentially applies to any liabilities of the institution not backed by assets or 
collateral. It does not apply to deposits protected by a deposit guarantee scheme, short-
term inter-bank lending or claims of clearing houses and payment and settlement systems 
(that have a remaining maturity of seven days), client assets, or liabilities such as salaries, 
pensions, or taxes. In exceptional circumstances, authorities can choose to exclude other 
liabilities on a case-by-case basis, if strictly necessary to ensure the continuity of critical 
services or to prevent widespread and disruptive contagion to other parts of the financial 
system, or if they cannot be bailed in in a reasonable timeframe. 
 
The write down will follow the ordinary allocation of losses and ranking in insolvency. Equity 
has to absorb losses in full before any debt claim is subject to write-down. After shares and 
other similar instruments, it will first, if necessary, impose losses evenly on holders of 
subordinated debt and then evenly on senior debt-holders. 
 
Deposits from SMEs and natural persons, including in excess of EUR 100,000, will be 
preferred over senior creditors. The deposit guarantee scheme to which the institution is 
affiliated (and the deposits it covers) will in turn rank above these. It will also be liable to 
assume losses for the amount that it would have had to bear if the bank had been wound up 
under normal insolvency proceedings. 
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 M. Schillig, ‘The EU Resolution toolbox’, in M. Haentjens and B. Wessels (eds.), Research Handbook on Crisis 
Management in the Banking Sector (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015). 
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For the bail-in tool to be a credible resolution tool, there must exist sufficient liabilities at 
the point when a resolution authority determines that an institution meets the conditions 
for resolution and that writing down or converting the debt of an institution would be in line 
with the objectives of resolution.18 
 
By definition, this will depend on the systemic importance of different institutions. 
Depending on their risk profile, complexity, size, interconnectedness etc., all banks need to 
maintain (subject to on-going verification by authorities), a percentage of their liabilities in 
the form of shares, contingent capital and other unsecured liabilities not explicitly excluded 
from bail-in. 
 
The exact degree of burden-sharing would depend on the bank in question, the amount of 
losses that would need to be covered, and the wider economic situation. Bail-in would a 
priori apply to any liability which is not excluded. In exceptional circumstances and where 
strictly necessary for financial stability, bail in could be discontinued upon reaching 8% of 
total liabilities including capital. After this, resolution funds could assume 5% of the losses. 
Public funds could either be provided to give limited backup support to the resolution fund 
at this point or, in extraordinary circumstances, directly to cover losses after the 5% 
contribution from the resolution fund and if bail-in has reached eligible deposits. Only in the 
scenario of severe systemic stress could public funds replace the resolution fund 
immediately, but only after bail-in up to 8% of total liabilities. 
 
Resolution and state aid rules 
 
As already mentioned, the BRRD and SRM aim to avoid as far as possible the use of 
taxpayers’ money during a bank failure. However, they do not prohibit the use of public 
funds to finance bank resolution notably in systemic crises. The BRRD and SRM do not 
prejudice the application of the EU state aid rules, provided of course that the assistance 
which is given to a bank can be classified as state aid. 
 
The 2013 Banking Communication requires that burden-sharing is enforced in all state aid 
granted to banks, not just in the case of resolution. It also defines the sequence for bailing-
in, as later laid down in the BRRD and the SRM Regulation. Banks that ask for state aid 
should undertake all measures to minimise the amount of public money they need to stay 
afloat. To that end, a bank with a capital shortfall should first carry out all possible capital 
raising measures by private means before it can resort to any public support. The Member 
State concerned and the bank have to set up a capital raising plan which has to be endorsed 
by the competent supervisory authority. Capital raising measures can, for example, include 
rights issues, a voluntary conversion of subordinated debt instruments into equity on the 
basis of a risk-related incentive, liability management exercises which should in principle be 
100% capital generating, sales of capital-generating assets and portfolios, securitisation of 
portfolios in order to generate capital from non-core activities, or an earnings retention.19 
 
Only if those measures are not sufficient to fill the capital shortfall, then shareholders and 
subordinated creditors will be required to contribute. 
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 Ibid. 
19
 C. Quigley QC, European State Aid Law and Policy. 
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In cases where the capital ratio of the bank remains above the EU regulatory minimum, the 
bank should normally be able to restore the capital position on its own, in particular through 
the capital raising measures mentioned above. If there are no other possibilities, including 
any other supervisory action such as early intervention measures or other remedial actions 
to overcome the shortfall defined by the supervisory authority, then subordinated debt 
must be converted into equity before state aid is granted. 
 
In cases where the bank no longer meets the minimum regulatory capital requirements, 
subordinated debt must be converted or written down before state aid is granted.  
 
Under the Banking Communication, the Commission can make an exception to the burden 
sharing requirements only when the implementation of writing down or conversion of 
subordinated creditors would lead to disproportionate results or would endanger financial 
stability. This could cover cases where the aid amount to be received is small in comparison 
to a bank’s risk weighted assets and the original capital shortfall has been significantly 
reduced through capital raising measures. The Commission decides about the application of 
the exception on a case by case basis.20 
 
When does resolution create a state aid situation? 
 
Given that both the SRM and BRRD stipulate that the SRF and the NRFs will use resources 
which are contributed by banks themselves over a period of 10 years, it is at first glance 
rather surprising that resolution is subject to state aid scrutiny. Therefore, it is reasonable to 
ask when the resolution of a bank creates a state aid situation. 
 
At this stage, the simple but not very precise or comprehensive answer is that there is a 
state aid situation when state resources are used in the resolution. As explained in more 
detail below, the concept of state resources covers not just funds which come from the 
budget of a public authority, but also private funds over which the state can exercise 
control.21 
 
This implies that if banks themselves or their associations decide to intervene in a fully 
private arrangement to rescue a failing bank, there is no state aid. In this case, funds are 
contributed voluntarily by the private sector and without any interference from the state. 
 
Otherwise, private resources, which flow through an entity which is controlled by the state, 
become state resources regardless of their origin. This would be the case with NRFs, despite 
the fact that they are capitalised through contributions by the banks themselves. The 
national resolution authorities manage these funds and decide when and how they are 
used. In this way, they seek to meet public policy objectives. If state resources are used and 
state aid is granted, the resolution has to be state-aid compliant. The responsible resolution 
authority has to decide whether to liquidate a failing bank under applicable insolvency 
                                                          
20
 Europa Rapid Press Release, State aid: Commission adapts crisis rules for banks - frequently asked questions, 
15 October 2013. 
21
 The landmark judgments on the concept of state resources are C-379/98, PreussenElektra; C-482/99, France 
v Commission; C-677/11, Doux Élevage; C-262/12, Association Vent De Colère. 
9 
 
procedures or whether it is in the public interest to resolve the bank under EU state aid 
rules and the SRM/BRRD requirements. 
 
But even if state resources are used, there may still not be state aid if a Member State 
chooses to intervene in a bank in the same way as a private investor would do. Then such an 
intervention would not constitute state aid because it does not confer any advantage that is 
not available under normal market conditions. For example, a loan can be granted at market 
prices fully reflecting the risk assumed by the public investor. Or, the state purchases assets 
at market prices. 
 
Conversely, if assets are transferred at above market prices or at book value to a bad bank, 
then they confer an advantage, they constitute state aid and can only be implemented if the 
bank is put into resolution, in compliance with state aid rules and relevant SRM/BRRD 
requirements. 
 
The practice of the Commission in applying state aid rules to resolved banks 
 
The Commission has assessed the resolution of several banks across the European Union. Its 
assessment covered both individual resolutions and schemes establishing a framework for 
the possible resolution of several banks. A sample of the most recent cases includes the 
following: SA.33001, Danish winding up scheme for credit institutions22; SA.34255, 
restructuring of CAM and Banco CAM, Spain23; SA.37425, credit unions orderly liquidation 
scheme, Poland24; SA.40441, MKB, Hungary; SA.36123, Banif, Portugal25; SA.41924, Banca 
Romagna Cooperativa, Italy26; SA.39543, Banca delle Marche, Italy27; SA.41134, Banca 
Popolare dell'Etruria e del Lazio, Italy28; SA.41925, Cassa di Risparmio di Ferrara, Italy29; 
SA.43547, Cassa di Risparmio della Provincia di Chieti, Italy30. 
 
The resolution plans in the last four cases were approved by the Commission on 22 
November 2015.31 The Italian resolution fund intervened to ensure the orderly resolution of 
the four banks in order to preserve financial stability. 
 
The four banks, with combined market share of about 1% in Italy, were put into resolution 
by a decision of the Bank of Italy. The Commission found that the use of the national 
resolution fund minimised the need for state aid and limited distortions of competition. 
Customer deposits remained fully protected. 32 
 
                                                          
22
 Denmark – SA.33001. 
23
 Spain – SA.34255. 
24
 Poland –  SA.37425. 
25
 Portugal – SA.40441. 
26
 Italy – SA.41924. 
27
 Italy – SA.39543. 
28
 Italy – SA.41134. 
29
 Italy – SA.41925. 
30
 Italy – SA.43547. 
31
 Europa Rapid Press Release, State aid: Commission approves resolution plans for four small Italian banks 
Banca Marche, Banca Etruria, Carife and Carichieti, 22 November 2015. 
32
 Ibid. 
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The resolution plans foresaw the immediate creation and capitalisation of four temporary 
bridge banks. All of the banks’ assets and liabilities, except remaining equity and 
subordinated debt, would be transferred to these bridge banks. This transfer would stabilise 
the activities that were formerly carried out by the banks and also protect depositors. The 
bridge banks would be sold in an open and non-discriminatory process with the aim to 
maximise the sales price. 
 
Italy's resolution fund would provide EUR 3.6 billion to the bridge banks, both to cover the 
negative difference between the transferred assets and liabilities and to capitalise the 
bridge banks. This would be financed by contributions from the Italian banking sector to the 
resolution fund. 
 
The measures also included a transfer of impaired assets from the bridge banks to a newly 
created Asset Management Vehicle. The resolution fund would guarantee this impaired 
asset measure. The benefit of the guarantee was quantified at approximately €400 million in 
additional support from the resolution fund. 
 
The interventions from the resolution fund qualified as state aid because the fund was 
considered to be an agency of the state carrying out public policy. 
 
The Commission found that the resolution measures were in line with the overarching 
objective of preserving financial stability, as required by the 2013 Banking Communication. 
Existing shareholders and subordinated debt holders contributed to the costs, reducing the 
need for the intervention by the resolution fund in line with burden-sharing principles. In 
order to limit distortions of competition, the bridge banks would only exist for a limited 
amount of a time. The Commission also committed to assess under EU state aid rules the 
viability of the entities resulting from the sale of the bridge banks.33 
 
Case study: SA.39451, Banca Tercas, Italy 
 
Unlike in the case of the four Italian banks mentioned earlier, the Commission decided on 
23 December 2015 that the resolution of Banca Tercas, another Italian bank, contained 
incompatible state aid.34 In this case the public support came from the Italian mandatory 
deposit guarantee scheme. 
 
Banca Tercas is a small Italian bank with a market share of about 0.1% of total banking 
assets in Italy. In July 2014, the Italian mandatory deposit guarantee scheme Fondo 
Interbancario di Tutela dei Depositi (FITD) intervened in favour of Banca Tercas in order to 
cover the losses of the bank and support its sale to Banca Popolare di Bari. The Commission 
found that the FITD acted on behalf of the Italian state and that the measures were not in 
line with EU state aid rules. 
 
In July 2014, the FITD with the approval of the Bank of Italy, provided approximately €300 
million in support (through capital injections and guarantees) to Banca Tercas for its 
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 Europa Rapid Press Release, State aid: Commission finds Italy provided incompatible state aid to Banca 
Tercas and welcomes plans of private funds to step in, 23 December 2015. 
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acquisition by Banca Popolare di Bari. The Commission opened an in-depth probe into the 
support measures in February 2015. In December 2015 it concluded that the Banca Tercas 
received incompatible state aid. The aid was not in compliance with the 2013 Banking 
Communication, because: 
1. Italy did not present a restructuring plan, so the Commission was not able to evaluate if 
the aided entity could return to long-term viability. 
2. Although Banca Tercas’ existing shareholders were fully written down at the time, 
subordinated creditors did not make any contribution to the cost of restructuring, as is 
required under burden-sharing principles. 
3. No measures were implemented that would have sufficiently limited the distortion of 
competition created by the aid.35 
 
Deposit guarantee schemes are mandatory under EU law to ensure that covered deposits 
are paid out when a bank is liquidated and exits the market, in which case there are no state 
aid issues. However, in the present case, the FITD intervened beyond this pay-out function 
to depositors by granting support to Banca Tercas which was in financial difficulty. Although 
the funds of FITD came from private sources [banks], if they came under public control 
before they were granted to Banca Tercas, and the decision to do so was attributed to the 
state. However, even if funds are state aid they can still be used to support an ailing bank, 
provided that the measures comply with the conditions of EU state aid rules and the BRRD. 
 
The FITD support in favour of Banca Tercas included the following measures:  
1. A non-repayable contribution of EUR 265 million to cover the negative equity of Tercas. 
2. A guarantee of EUR 35 million (for three years) to cover the credit risk associated with 
certain exposures of Tercas. 
3. A guarantee of EUR 30 million to cover part of the possible additional cost and losses (of 
EUR 60 million) associated with the tax treatment of the non-repayable contribution of 
EUR 265 million. 
4. The Commission also believed that Banca Tercas benefitted from indirect state aid 
because, under Italian law, FITD’s support interventions are not subject to normal 
corporate taxes.36 
 
The views of the Commission on the use of state resources 
According to recital 3 of Directive 2014/4937, “measures [carried out by DGSs] should always 
comply with the State aid rules.” According to recital 16 “it should also be possible, where 
permitted under national law, for a DGS to go beyond a pure reimbursement function and 
to use the available financial means in order to prevent the failure of a credit institution 
with a view to avoiding the costs of reimbursing depositors and other adverse impacts. 
Those measures should, however, be carried out within a clearly defined framework and 
should in any event comply with State aid rules”. Point 63 of the 2013 Banking 
Communication states that, “the use of [deposit guarantee funds] or similar funds to assist 
in the restructuring of credit institutions may constitute State aid. Whilst the funds in 
question may derive from the private sector, they may constitute aid to the extent that they 
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 Ibid. 
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 Directive 2014/49/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on deposit guarantee 
schemes, [2014] OJ L 173/149. 
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come within the control of the State and the decision as to the funds’ application is 
imputable to the State”. 
 
“44) The Commission also points out that statutory DGSs are extremely likely to grant State 
aid when they intervene to prevent the failure of a credit institution, given that they act 
under a public mandate of the Member State and remain under the control of the public 
authority.” 
 
Imputability to the state 
“45) The Court of Justice has repeatedly confirmed that all financial means by which the 
public authorities actually support undertakings fall under State aid control, irrespective of 
whether those means are permanent assets of the public sector. Compulsory contributions 
that are mandatory by and managed and apportioned in accordance with the law or other 
public rules imply a transfer of State resources, even if not administered by the public 
authorities. The mere fact that resources are financed in part by private contributions is not 
sufficient to rule out the public character of those resources since the relevant factor is not 
the direct origin of the resources but the degree of intervention of the public authority 
within the definition of the measure and its method of financing.” 
 
“46) Moreover, as the Court of Justice pointed out in Ladbroke [C-83/98 P, France v 
Ladbroke Racing and Commission], in Stardust Marine [C-482/99, France v Commission] and 
in Doux Élevage [C-677/11, Doux Élevage and Coopérative agricole UKL-ARREE], resources 
that remain under public control and are therefore available to the public authorities, 
constitute State resources.”  
 
“47) In Doux Élevage, the Court of Justice noted that in the particular case of a trade 
organisation, whose resources were raised by levies made mandatory by the State, the 
public authorities had not received powers to actually use the resources to support 
particular undertakings. The trade organisation had set its objectives itself, while the State 
would only control the validity and lawfulness of the trade organisation's levying of 
contributions. In particular, the Court of Justice pointed out in Doux Élevage that the 
mandatory nature of the levies was in that case not “dependent upon the pursuit of political 
objectives which are specific, fixed and defined by the public authorities”.  
 
“48) The Court of Justice has also clarified in Stardust Marine that imputability to the State 
of an aid measure taken by a prima facie independent body (for instance, a public 
undertaking) can be inferred from a set of indicators arising from the circumstances of the 
case, such as the fact that, apart from factors of an organic nature which link it to the State, 
the body in question cannot take the contested decision without taking into account the 
requirements or directives of the public authorities before taking the decision allegedly 
involving State aid. Other indicators might, in certain circumstances, be relevant in 
concluding that an aid measure taken by a public undertaking is imputable to the State. [see 
for example the reference to “supervision by public authorities” in case T-387/11 
Nitrogénművek Vegyipari Zrt. v Commission].   Similarly, the fact that private persons 
participate in the running of an entity is not sufficient to exclude imputability to the State of 
the interventions at issue.” 
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“49) In the Austrian Green Electricity Act judgment of December 2014, the General Court 
found that … the green electricity aid mechanism and the partial exemption of energy-
intensive users from the financing of green electricity [to be] imputable to the State [T-
251/11 Austria v Commission (Austrian Green Electricity Act)]. The fact that they were 
established by law was held sufficient to conclude to such imputability.”  
 
“50) In the case at issue, the FITD's interventions in bank restructuring and resolution are 
discretionary when taken at a Member State's level - in contrast to interventions in 
liquidation cases, which are mandated by Directive 2014/49 - and fulfil a public policy 
mandate laid down in Italian law at the discretion of the State.” 
 
“53) Thus, the FITD's support interventions in bank restructuring and resolution follow the 
public policy mandate of depositor protection under the control of Member State 
authorities, but that instrument is in addition to and not the same as the obligatory function 
laid down in Union law (Directive 2014/49) which is to pay out covered depositors in the 
case of liquidation.” 
 
“54) The interventions of the FITD to prevent the failure of one of its member banks follow a 
public mandate of the Member State and … the Statutes of the FITD must be approved by 
the Bank of Italy.” 
 
“55) Moreover, the Italian authorities appear to constantly control whether the use of the 
FITD resources is consistent with its specific public policy mandate and to have at least co-
decided with FITD to use the latter's resources in favour of Tercas.” 
 
“60) The Commission is of the opinion that, contrary to the elements invoked by the Court 
of Justice in Doux Élevage, … the FITD remained under constant public control, which was 
effectively performed, over objectives that are specific, fixed and defined by the public 
authorities, going beyond a mere formal control of the validity and lawfulness of FITD's 
behaviour.” 
 
“61) The Commission considers that those elements are indicators showing that the FITD's 
interventions in favour of Tercas constitute State resources and are imputable to the State.” 
 
The incompatibility of the aid with the internal market 
“90) … there are no or very insufficient elements showing that:  
1. The implemented interventions are appropriate to achieve the objective of ensuring the 
long-term viability of Tercas. In that respect the Commission notes that it has not 
received a restructuring plan of Tercas”. 
2. Appropriate measures have been taken to ensure that the aid is proportionate, i.e. 
limited to the minimum amount necessary to achieve their objective. In particular there 
should have been an adequate "burden-sharing" of restructuring costs by those who 
invested in the bank, such as subordinated creditors, in compliance with the 2013 
Banking Communication. 
3. The interventions must be appropriately remunerated in line with the requirements laid 
down in the Crisis Communications. As matter of fact, there seems to have been no 
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payment or other kind of significant contribution in consideration for the recapitalisation 
and guarantee interventions. 
4. The costs of restructuring Tercas have to be limited to the minimum necessary. 
Sufficient measures have been taken to limit distortions of competition, calibrated in 
such a way as to approximate as much as possible the market situation which would 
have materialised if Tercas has exited the market without aid.” 
 
In another similar case, also involving an Italian bank – Banca Romagna Cooperativa – the 
Commission noted in its decision SA.41924, that in addition, and despite the fact that at that 
time [July 2015] Italy had not yet transposed the BRRD into national law, the Commission 
had to assess whether the aid measure in question violated “indissolubly linked provisions” 
of the BRRD. According to the Commission, “79) that obligation is in line with the 
jurisprudence of the Union Courts, which have consistently held "that those aspects of aid 
which contravene specific provisions of the Treaty other than [Articles 107 and 108 TFEU] 
may be so indissolubly linked to the object of the aid that it is impossible to evaluate them 
separately to that their effect on the compatibility or incompatibility of the aid viewed as a 
whole must therefore of necessity be determined in the light of the procedure prescribed in 
[Article108]". 
 
“80) To ascertain whether a violation of a provision of Union law is indissolubly linked to the 
object of the aid, a relation of necessity has to be established. It means that the State aid 
measure has to be connected with a national measure in a way that necessarily breaches a 
specific provision of Union law which is relevant for the compatibility analysis under 
paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 107 TFEU. 81) The Commission has not identified BRRD 
provisions which would be indissolubly linked to the specific aid measure under 
examination. 82) This is without prejudice to the prerogative of the Commission to initiate 
infringement procedures against a Member State for breach of Union Law, including breach 
of BRRD provisions.” In this case, the aid for the partial liquidation and sale of the remaining 
assets of the bank was found to be compatible with the internal market. 
 
In summary, there is little doubt that when NRFs or national deposit guarantee schemes are 
mobilised to bail out banks, they use state resources and their decisions can be imputed or 
attributed to the state. The argumentation of the Commission, as exemplified by the Banca 
Tercas case, is convincing. 
 
There is no state aid when the resolution is fully funded by private resources or when a 
national deposit guarantee scheme limits its intervention only to protecting covered 
deposits [i.e. up to EUR 100,000]. The use of such schemes for purposes that go beyond 
protecting covered deposits, even though it is legally possible, will in all likelihood constitute 
state aid. 
 
However, for the Eurozone countries, as of 1 January 2016, the SRF and the SRB replace the 
NRFs and the national resolution authorities. The SRB is a “Union agency” with its own legal 
personality [Article 42 of the SRB Regulation]. Article 107(1) TFEU applies to Member States 
or state resources. The SRB is not a Member State, nor is it a public authority that comes 
under the control of any Member State. Therefore, the next section examines why and how 
state aid rules may apply to the SRF. 
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The SRB, the SRF and state aid 
 
What needs to be clarified at the outset is whether the SRB could in principle be subject to 
state aid discipline. As mentioned above, the SRB is a Union agency. Article 47 of the SRB 
Regulation stipulates that the SRB acts independently and that its Chair, Vice-Chair and its 
four permanent members also act independently and take no instruction from any Member 
State. The other members of the SRB are appointed by Member States, one per Member 
State. This means that at present the SRB has six permanent members plus 19 members 
representing national resolution authorities, making 25 in total. 
 
The Regulation provides that the SRB decides by consensus or simple majority. It is 
conceivable that the members appointed by Member States outvote the permanent 
members. But, it is rather unlikely that 13 Member States will agree to take a position 
contrary to that of the other six Member States. At any rate, it cannot be presumed that in 
all cases the SRB will be acting to further the interests or policy objectives of any particular 
Member State. 
 
What is perhaps surprising is that despite the fact the SRB Regulation establishes the SRB as 
an independent EU agency, it still subjects it to state aid control.38 Article 19 of the 
Regulation lays down a detailed procedure that has to be followed not only when the 
resolution actions of the SRB contain state aid [i.e. use of state resources proper through 
the involvement of a national authority] but also when the funding comes solely from the 
SRF. 
 
Article 19 provides the following: 
1. Where resolution action involves the granting of state aid or of Fund aid, the adoption of 
the resolution scheme shall not take place until the Commission has adopted a positive 
or conditional decision concerning the compatibility of the aid with the internal market. 
[It should be noted that the Regulation creates a new funding category, that of “Fund 
aid”, just to make sure that it is well understood that money from the SRF also falls 
within the scope of Article 107(1) TFEU.] 
2. The Member State or Member States concerned must notify the envisaged measures to 
the Commission under Article 108(3) TFEU. 
3. When the resolution action involves the use of the Fund, the SRB must notify it to the 
Commission. The Commission decides on the compatibility of the use of the Fund with 
the internal market. Its decision is addressed to the Board and to the relevant national 
resolution authorities. That decision may lay down obligations on the beneficiary, the 
Board, or the national resolution authorities. 
4. If there is no compliance with the Commission decision, the Commission can issue a 
decision to the national resolution authority requiring recovery of the misused amounts. 
Recovered Fund aid must be paid back to the Board. 
 
It is clear that the SRB must comply with state aid rules, regardless of whether it is a 
European agency or not, regardless of whether the resources used are contributed by the 
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banks themselves and regardless of whether the support is formally classified as state aid or 
Fund aid. Moreover, Article 44 of the SRB Regulation imposes an explicit obligation on the 
SRB to act in conformity with EU law, in general, and Commission decisions, in particular. 
 
Assessment 
 
Although the BRRD and the SRM make the use of state aid less likely because they bail in 
shareholders and creditors before banks are bailed out with public funds, they still require 
that decisions of the national resolution authorities and of the SRB are compliant with state 
aid rules. This means that banks in the Eurozone and outside the Eurozone will be treated in 
the same way. Application of state aid rules and, by extension, subjecting resolution 
decisions to the scrutiny of the Commission will ensure that the competitive field will be 
level and fair not only when banks prosper but also when they exit the market or 
restructure. Given that actions under the SRM have to be consistent with actions under the 
BRRD and, by implications, actions under national resolution regimes, there should be 
greater uniformity across the whole of the EU in resolving or restructuring banks. This in 
itself should allay the fears of the UK and perhaps other non-Eurozone countries that 
deeper integration in the Eurozone will somehow be to their disadvantage. 
 
Indeed one of the requests of the UK in its negotiations of a new relationship with the EU is 
that deeper integration in the Eurozone does not disadvantage the non-euro countries.39 
The SRM and BRRD ensure that, at least as far as state aid to banks is concerned, 
restructuring and resolution will be carried out on the basis of the same rules and will be 
approved by the same institution – the Commission – which should bring about consistency 
in how the rules are applied. 
 
Ironically, if there is a disadvantage it will be to the detriment of banks in the Eurozone 
rather than the other way around. This is because the procedure involving the SRB is more 
cumbersome as any decision will have to be approved by many more actors. In addition, the 
members of the SRB may have distinct views and, despite their independence, these views 
may be coloured by their national origin and responsibilities in the national resolution 
mechanisms. 
 
Although there is little doubt that state aid discipline ensures equal treatment of all EU 
banks and minimises distortions to competition across the internal EU market, at a more 
theoretical level the question remains whether the SRB should have been empowered to 
apply state aid rules without further involvement of the Commission. There are credible 
arguments both in favour and against. 
 
On the one hand, state aid rules are well understood. This suggests that the involvement of 
the Commission is not necessary. In 2004, the enforcement of Article 101(1&3) TFEU was 
decentralised. Perhaps the time has come to centralise the enforcement of restructuring 
and resolution of banks which are funded by resources managed at EU level without any 
further need for Commission approval. 
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On the other hand, restructuring, as well as resolution, requires discretion and judgment. 
Such discretion can be exercised consistently only if it is exercised by the same institution. 
This suggests that the involvement of the Commission is indispensable. In the end, only the 
future will tell whether the extra uniformity in the application of state aid rules brought 
about by the involvement of the Commission is worth the extra administrative bureaucracy. 
 
Conclusions 
 
The aim of the BRRD and SRM is twofold: to ensure that 1) ailing banks close down in an 
orderly fashion or that are properly restructured if they can become viable again and that 2) 
the use of public resources is minimised. The first aim restores the health of financial 
markets while the second aim protects the health of public budgets. Both of them make the 
use of state aid less likely. Both of them protect small depositors and prevent systematic 
failure. And, therefore, both of them lay the foundations for the long-term recovery of the 
European economy. 
 
However, the SRM has added an extra layer of bureaucracy and complexity. In addition, to 
the involvement of national authorities and the Commission, in its capacity as the institution 
that assesses the compatibility of aid, decisions have to be taken collectively by the SRB too. 
The collective nature of such decisions suggests that the assessment of the Commission is 
less necessary or at least that the decisions should be subject to a lighter scrutiny by the 
Commission. 
 
 
